Justin Sherman (@jshermcyber) is a fellow at the Atlantic Councils Cyber Statecraft Initiative. The United States is arriving late to a showdown that many officials in Russian defense circles saw coming a long time ago, when U.S. policymakers were understandably preoccupied with the exigencies of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, News /content/admin/rand-header/jcr:content/par/header/reports, /content/admin/rand-header/jcr:content/par/header/blogPosts, /content/admin/rand-header/jcr:content/par/header/multimedia, /content/admin/rand-header/jcr:content/par/header/caseStudies, Sleep Deprivation Could Do Long-Term Damage to Migrant Children, How China Understands and Assesses Military Balance, Russian Military Operations in Ukraine in 2022 and the Year Ahead. - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. The U.S. recently suspended its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and gave notice of its intent to withdraw after long-term violations of the treaty by Russia, a. 1 Build a more lethal force. JFHQ-DODIN which is a component command of USCYBERCOM is the organization that is responsible for securing, operating, and defending the DOD complex infrastructure of roughly 15,000 networks with 3 million users. The U.S. and Russia should strive toward a much better understanding of one anothers red lines (i.e., what actions would trigger retaliation, especially kinetic retaliation) and cyber-mission priorities, intents, capabilities and organization. A cyberattack does not necessarily require a cyber response, she added. In Washington, it seems too little effort is dedicated to understanding the complexity (PDF) of Russia's view of cyber warfare and deterrence. There are also cyber criminals who pose a. Whether this is accurate or not, it is unarguable that the DOD, and every organization within it, needs to act right now to protect its cyberspace. The Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), managed by Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), serves as the DODIN backbone (Figure 3). Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr @MMazarr, et al. Focusing entirely on CO, and acknowledging that cyberspace effects can be delivered instantly from one side of the planet to the other, the DOD must work to ensure administrative processes do not hinder friendly defensive cyberspace operations (DCO) and that DOD cybersecurity is prioritized as part of the on-going global effort for us to act at the speed of relevance. The authors likewise have differing assessments of cyber-related progress on the diplomatic front: While the Russian author describes impressive successes in bringing the U.S. and Russian positions on cybersecurity closer together at the U.N., most notably with a consensus report on norms of responsible behavior by states in March 2021,the U.S. authors note that Russia hasused multilateral institutions, including two U.N. groups on cybersecurity, to advance its own conceptualization of cyber norms, sometimes undermining Western influence.. Continual campaigning is when the joint force is continually competing and adapting in response to strategic conditions and policy objectives through different levels of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. Automation and large-scale data analytics will help identify cyberattacks and make sure our systems are still effective. NDIA is not responsible for screening, policing, editing, or monitoring your or another user's postings and encourages all of its users to use reasonable discretion and caution in evaluating or reviewing any posting. We have only created a band-aid solution and pieced together the infrastructure with the cheapest possible solutions. You are also agreeing to our. At some point theU.S. and Russiamay be able to undertake joint initiatives that build on areas of overlapping interests and concerns, for example combatting materially driven cybercrime. Subscribe to the weekly Policy Currents newsletter to receive updates on the issues that matter most. We proceeded to formulate research questions (see Appendix 2) and seek out authors who could separately explore the American and the Russian perspectives on the cyber-treaty idea. The full consequences of potential adversary cyberspace operations (CO) in the DOD are still being fully understood. These include: Protecting DOD Cyberspace, Now and Beyond. Arguably, the DODs established processes and bureaucracy are not suited to the fast-paced world of cyberspace. By also sharing this information with JFHQ-DODIN, this establishes awareness of the DODs cybersecurity posture, DOD-wide. Nonetheless, events since 2016 reflect a convergence of the two factors. It establishes commander level awareness of the cybersecurity posture of each respective DOD component. The stage is set to successfully consolidate multiple cybersecurity efforts. Capabilities are going to be more diverse and adaptable. In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations blurring of the line between peace and war. Or, as Nye wrote, in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer programs user.. As the United States emerges from the era of so-called forever wars, it should abandon the regime change business for good. Washington and Moscow share several similarities related to cyber deterrence. Since the US has experienced successful and harmful cyber-attacks on the critical infrastructures, protecting the DOD cyberspace from adversaries is more important than ever. That means a thorough strategy is needed to preserve U.S. cyberspace superiority and stop cyberattacks before they hit our networks. There are three types of cyberspace missions: offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations (DODIN Ops); and, four types of cyberspace actions: attack, exploitation, security, and defense ( Figure 1 ). Joint Staff J-7 Tim Blevins, Air Land Sea Space Application (ALSSA) Center, Meeting The Immediate Needs of the Warfighter, By Maj Eric Pederson (USAF), MAJ Don Palermo (USA), MAJ Stephen Fancey (USA), LCDR (Ret) Tim Blevins, Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil, Standardizing network sensors (e.g. Cyberspace defensive joint force doctrine is still being developed, defensive cyberspace DOD authorities are not well known, and the U.S. and its allies do not have cyberspace supremacy (i.e. This is different from a traditional campaign designed around the idea that the world is either at peace or at war. Figure1: Cyberspace Operations Missions, Actions, and Forces. Securing DoD information and systems against malicious cyber activity, including DoD information on non-DoD-owned networks; and 5. Air Force Senior Airman Kevin Novoa and Air Force Tech. Full event video and after-event thoughts from the panelists. Navy Warfare Development Center (NWDC) More than 5.3 million others are still estimated to be . By tallying several key indices for countries cosponsoring competing cyber-related resolutions proposed by Russia and the U.S. at the United Nations in 2018 and 2020, he demonstrates that the countries on Russias side are much less technologically advanced and politically less integrated into the digital world than those on the U.S. side: There seems to be a clear borderline between the nations that pursue strong government control similar to Russias sovereign internet or Chinas Great Firewall and those that promote freedom of speech and a more democratic internet.. Marine Corps (Currently, ambiguity can be problematic even within a single language, much less across languages; the term cyberattack, for example, is widely used in English-language news media and everyday speech to mean any sort of breach of cyber systems, while the U.S. military, The distinction between cyber defense and cyber offense. [7] Pomerleau, Mark, The Pentagon is moving away from the Joint Regional Security Stacks, C4ISRNET, November 1 2021, https://www.c4isrnet.com/it-networks/2021/11/01/the-pentagon-is-moving-away-from-the-joint-regional-security-stacks/. By no means should the Kremlin's activity go unanswered. While the Russian author believes that a risk of cyber-related escalation to kinetic conflict between Russia and the U.S. does exist (for instance, in the event of a cyber breach of the other sides weapons systems), the U.S. authors are hesitant to affirm the likelihood of such escalation as there have not yet been significant real-world examples of it and, more generally, the risks are still underexplored. Data routing security is one such example. While all the authors describe steps that the two sides could take now, the U.S. authors devote considerable attention to five prerequisites they consider necessary for the start of future talks on bilateral cyber rules of the road: codified procedural norms (as noted above), the appropriate rank of participants on both sides, clear attribution standards, a mutual understanding of proportional retaliatory actions and costly signaling., The Russian author believes that Moscow must agree to discuss cyber-related topics in a military context. Why Life is Complicated for Combatant Commands. The Russian government tries to maintain greater control over domestic cyberspace than does the U.S., primarily to ensure political stability. Troops have to increasingly worry about cyberattacks. In February 2010, the Defense Science Board released a report that stated "the inability to exploit foreign networks for intelligence purposes". This comprehensive approach creates interesting synergies for the Russian military. While the United States has displayed a growing willingness to launch operations against Russia, Moscow has somewhat bolstered its military cyber capacity by expanding recruiting initiatives and malware development. It offers a separate voice within the military for the use of airpower on the strategic stage. Cyberspace is a wild west with a low barrier to entry where both nations and criminals can exploit it for their own ends. Holding DOD personnel and third-party contractors more accountable for slip-ups. used motorcycles for sale waco how does the dod leverage cyberspace with nato data science course singapore skillsfuture In coo certification programs by October 11, 2022 February 1, 2023 USCYBERCOM has published a cyber warfighting publication (CWP) that outlines how to do this. A dual identity (military and law enforcement) and alignment under the Department of Homeland Security allow a separate cyber service to protect our nations global infrastructure from state actors who will be indistinguishable from criminal threats. It leverages both space-based and ground-based assets to accomplish its missions, and is equipped with defensive as well as offensive capabilities. Moscow sees an unwavering cyber omnipotence in the United States, capable of crafting uniquely sophisticated malware like the Stuxnet virus, all while using digital operations to orchestrate regional upheaval, such as the Arab Spring in 2011. Establishing a separate service in the air domain was not instantaneous or without controversy: creation of the US Air Force was gradational, spanned two world wars, and was marked by resistance from within the Army and Navy. [3] The Chinese are heading for global dominance because of their advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and cyber capabilities, and that these emerging technologies were far more critical to Americas future than hardware such as big-budget fifth-generation fighter jets such as the F-35. Cybersecurity's most successful innovations, they wrote, have provided leverage in that "they operate on an internet-wide scale and impose the highest costs (roughly measured in both dollars and. - Foreign Affairs, Paper with Jeremi Suri Incentivizing computer science-related jobs in the department to make them more attractive to skilled candidates who might consider the private sector instead. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. Special reports by expert journalists focus on defense budgets, military tactics, doctrine and strategy. February 22, 2023 The Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff has primacy in external cyberspace operations, to include espionage, information warfare, and offensive cyberspace operations. Annual Lecture on China: Frayed RelationsThe United States and China, Virtual Event If so, what form could it take? The typically furtive conflict went public last month, when the New York Times reported U.S. Cyber Command's shift to a more offensive and aggressive approach in targeting Russia's electric power grid. A cyber operation can constitute an act of war or use of force, she pointed out. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hosted by Defense Media Activity - WEB.mil. Cyber Bones of Contention in US-Russian Relations 37 At some point the U.S. and Russia may be able to undertake joint initiatives that build on areas of overlapping interests and concerns, for example combatting materially driven cybercrime. Cambridge, MA 02138 An official website of the United States Government. Choose which Defense.gov products you want delivered to your inbox. Make no mistake, until such a time, will all leaderships in such fields fail to fly and be earthbound on the ground in the form of great white elephants/massive money pits which just scratch at the surface of solutions and offer no panoramic picture of successes easily made available. Joint Electronic Library (JEL+), An official website of the United States government, U.S. Cyber Command members work in the Integrated Cyber Center, Joint Operations Center at Fort George G. Meade, Md., April. NOCs configure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain the CCMD cyberspace and are primarily responsible for operating CCMD cyberspace. American political scientistJoseph Nye, a former head of the U.S. National Intelligence Council,wrote in 2019that, even if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable in cyberspace, it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict. Robert G. Papp, a former director of the CIAs Center for Cyber Intelligence, has likewisearguedthat even a cyber treaty of limited duration with Russia would be a significant step forward. On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin himselfhas called fora bilateral intergovernmental agreement on preventing incidents in the information space, comparing it to the Soviet-American Agreement on thePrevention of Incidentson and Over the High Seas.